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PRIVATE INTEREST, PUBLIC SPHERE: 
ELIMINATING THE USE OF COMMERCIAL 
BAIL BONDSMEN IN THE CRIMINAL 
JUSTICE SYSTEM 
Abstract: The decision to grant bail is the first contact that a judge has with a de-
fendant. If a defendant is unable to pay the set bail amount, this inability affects 
nearly every aspect of the defendant’s case from beginning to end. Despite at-
tempts to ensure insolvency does not solely determine pretrial detention, the cur-
rent bail system, in many cases, ensures just that. Special interest groups, specifi-
cally the bail bond industry, oppose any reform efforts that aim to decrease the 
use of money in the administration of bail. Defendants unable to afford a bail 
bondsman can spend weeks, months, and sometimes years detained while await-
ing their day in court. Law and public policy compels courts to secure bail only 
to the extent that it will guarantee a defendant’s appearance in court. This Note 
argues that in order to accomplish this, two important changes must occur. First, 
commercial bail bonds should be eliminated in favor of a system in which cash 
bail is not the default method of securing pretrial release. Second, all states 
should establish and maintain pretrial services agencies that aid courts in making 
bail determinations. 
INTRODUCTION 
By 2007, Florida’s Broward County had seen an explosion in its jail pop-
ulation, resulting in illegal levels of overcrowding.1 To address this overcrowd-
ing problem, the county would need to spend between $60 and $70 million to 
build a new jail.2 Rather than committing this large sum to building a new jail, 
                                                                                                                           
 1 See Brian Haas, Study on Jail Overcrowding in Broward Spreads Blame, SUN SENTINEL (Ft. 
Lauderdale) (Feb. 17, 2007), http://articles.sun-sentinel.com/2007-02-17/news/0702160715_1_average-
daily-jail [https://perma.cc/3N7T-EG2T] (detailing the consistent overcrowding of Broward County jails 
and placing blame on a justice system that leaves defendants in jail for long periods of time). With a 
history of overcrowded jails, a federal decree requires Broward County to provide a bed for every prison-
er or risk fines. See Larry Lebowitz, Jail Crowding Heads to Court, SUN SENTINEL (Ft. Lauderdale) (July 
14, 1998), http://articles.sun-sentinel.com/1998-07-14/news/9807140016_1_jail-lawsuit-jail-doors-
prisoners [https://perma.cc/G4JB-R2GK] (describing the 1995 federal order). 
 2 See Haas, supra note 1 (detailing the consistent overcrowding of Broward County jails); see 
also David M. Reutter & Mel Motel, Bail Bond Companies Profit While Poorest Defendants Remain 
in Jail, PRISON LEGAL NEWS (Sept. 15, 2012), https://www.prisonlegalnews.org/news/2012/sep/
15/bail-bond-companies-profit-while-poorest-defendants-remain-in-jail/ [https://perma.cc/78N3-3TUZ] 
(noting that the cost of building a new jail was estimated to be approximately $70 million); Scott 
Wyman, Pretrial Releases to Be Expanded, SUN SENTINEL (Ft. Lauderdale) (Jan. 16, 2008), http://
articles.sun-sentinel.com/2008-01-16/news/0801150478_1_pretrial-release-new-jail-release-program 
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the Broward County Commission instead doubled the budget of pretrial release 
services, or pretrial services agencies (“PSAs”), in order to reduce the amount 
of prisoners in the jail through pretrial release.3 
Within a year of this decision, Broward County’s jail population de-
creased significantly.4 As a result of the decreased population, the county was 
able to not only refrain from building a new jail but also close a wing of one of 
its existing jails.5 The expansion of PSAs saved taxpayers millions of dollars 
in one year.6 Criminal justice organizations in Broward County hailed the pro-
gram as a success.7 
In 2009, however, the Broward County Commission voted to significantly 
scale back the use of PSAs.8 The bail bond industry was at the root of this de-
cision.9 In the year preceding the vote to scale back PSAs, bail bond compa-
                                                                                                                           
[https://perma.cc/YP4Y-XHB7] (noting that a new jail would cost $60 million to build and $30 mil-
lion per year to run). 
 3 See Laura Sullivan, Bondsman Lobby Targets Pretrial Release Programs, NPR (Jan. 22, 2010), 
http://www.npr.org/templates/story/story.php?storyId=122725849 [https://perma.cc/R7DV-A8Y3] 
(explaining the actions of a bail bondsman lobby to eliminate pretrial services agencies (“PSAs”) in 
Broward County and how lobbies in other states are undertaking similar measures); Wyman, supra 
note 2 (describing the expansion of pretrial release services). Pretrial release services review a defend-
ant’s background and present circumstances and make recommendations for release to a judge. See 
Wyman, supra note 2. Some criteria that they consider are the nature of the defendant’s charges, crim-
inal history, past court appearances, and mental health issues. Id. Some conditions of release are su-
pervision via home visits, electronic monitoring, GPS monitoring, and drug testing. Id. 
 4 See Reutter & Motel, supra note 2, at 36 (calling Broward County’s expansion of PSAs “an 
amazing success”); see also Russell Nichols, States Struggle to Regulate the Bond Industry, GOVERN-
ING (Apr. 2011), http://www.governing.com/topics/public-justice-safety/States-Struggle-to-Regulate-
the-Bond-Industry.html [https://perma.cc/BP6Q-DACD] (exploring the effects of the expansion of 
Broward County’s PSAs). 
 5 See Nichols, supra note 4 (noting that the county was able to save $20 million by expanding 
PSAs); Sullivan, supra note 3 (stating that the commission was able to avoid building a new jail by 
expanding PSAs). 
 6 See Nichols, supra note 4. Closing the wing of the existing jail saved $20 million in operating 
costs. See id. Additionally, the PSAs cost about $7 a day per defendant to operate whereas housing 
inmates in jail costs about $115 a day per inmate. See id. 
 7 See id.; see also Reutter & Motel, supra note 2, at 36 (describing the expansion of PSAs as “an 
amazing success”); Bob Norman, Broward County Bail Bondsmen Want to Kill Pretrial Intervention, 
and the County Commission Is Willing to Help, BROWARD PALM BEACH NEW TIMES (Dec. 18, 2008, 
4:00 AM), http://www.browardpalmbeach.com/news/broward-county-bail-bondsmen-want-to-kill-
pretrial-intervention-and-the-county-commission-is-willing-to-help-6312109 [https://perma.cc/8SGK-
DFAY] (exploring how the expansion of PSAs acted as a solution to overcrowded jails and helped 
Broward County comply with a 1995 federal order to provide a bed for every prisoner). 
 8 See Norman, supra note 7 (detailing the circumstances that led the commission to scale back its 
previous decision to expand PSAs). 
 9 See id.; see also Nichols, supra note 4 (exploring the involvement of the bail bond industry with 
the Broward County Commission and expansion of PSAs). Bail bondsmen from Broward County 
were opposed to the expansion of PSAs because it decreased their customer base. See id. Additionally, 
they claimed that operation of PSAs was expensive for taxpayers whereas their services cost taxpayers 
nothing. See id. 
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nies donated thousands of dollars to county commissioners’ campaigns.10 Ad-
ditionally, they hired a lobbyist to push the commissioners to decrease funding 
for PSAs and to encourage them to pass an ordinance decreasing the categories 
of prisoners that were eligible for release through PSAs.11 Two years after vot-
ing to expand PSAs, the commission passed an ordinance that substantially 
muted the effect of PSAs.12 Some criminal justice professionals decried the 
decision and claimed that the ordinance would result in thousands of prisoners 
sitting in jail unable to afford their set bail.13 
The inability to pay bail is not unique to Broward County, and in fact, 
millions of prisoners throughout the United States are currently incarcerated 
because they are unable to pay their bail.14 On Rikers Island in New York City, 
nearly forty percent of jailed individuals are incarcerated because they cannot 
                                                                                                                           
 10 See Reutter & Motel, supra note 2, at 36 (stating that Broward County bail bond companies 
donated $23,000 to county commissioners); see also Buddy Nevins, As Broward Commission Races 
Take Shape, LaMarca, Keechel Fear Nasty Re-Run, FL. BULLDOG (Feb. 5, 2014, 6:17 AM), http://
www.floridabulldog.org/2014/02/as-broward-commission-races-take-shape-lamarca-keechl-fear-
nasty-re-run/ [https://perma.cc/CMF5-SJK9] (detailing the link between one commissioner and the 
bail bond industry following the commissioner’s vote to curb the county’s use of PSAs). Ken Keechel, 
a commissioner who voted in favor of reducing the use of PSAs, received the support of the bail bond 
industry in his reelection bid. See id. Wayne Speath, the president of Brandy Bail Bonds, hosted a 
fundraiser for Keechel, and Keechel received thousands of dollars from contributors who self-identify 
as a part of the bail bond industry. See id. 
 11 See Norman, supra note 7 (detailing the hiring of a lobbyist by the Broward County Bail 
Bondsman Association). Ron Book, the lobbyist hired by the association, was also a lobbyist for the 
Broward County Commissioners. See id.; see also Nichols, supra note 4; Reutter & Motel, supra note 
2, at 36. 
 12 See Nichols, supra note 4 (describing the effect of the ordinance); Reutter & Motel, supra note 
2, at 37 (arguing that passage of the ordinance resulted in thousands of people being stuck in Broward 
County jails because they could not afford to pay a bail bondsman and pretrial release services were 
no longer available). 
 13 See Reutter & Motel, supra note 2, at 37. Howard Finkelstein, a Broward County public de-
fender, claims that lobbying by bail bondsmen resulted in poor defendants remaining in jail. See id. In 
reference to the motivations of the bail bondsmen, Finkelstein supplied, “‘[y]ou’re doing it for your 
own good, that’s fine, but then you shouldn’t have a seat at the table when public policy is made.’” 
See id. 
 14 See Press Release, N.Y. Civil Liberties Union, New York City Takes Important Step Toward 
Ending Destructive Cash Bail System (July 8, 2015), http://www.nyclu.org/news/new-york-city-takes-
important-step-toward-ending-destructive-cash-bail-system [https://perma.cc/SQV9-Q9CR] [hereinaf-
ter Civil Liberties Union Press Release] (noting that nearly forty percent of Rikers’ prison population 
remains in jail solely because they cannot afford bail); see also Ali Montag, How You Can Get Stuck 
in Jail Without Being Guilty, CNBC, (Aug. 3 2015, 9:46 AM), http://www.cnbc.com/2015/08/03/bail-
bonds-the-cost-of-freedom.html [https://perma.cc/G644-XYZT] (stating that forty percent of detainees 
at New York’s Rikers Island cannot afford bail); Shane Bauer, Here’s What Sandra Bland’s Death 
Says About Our Broken Bail System, MOTHERJONES.COM (Jul. 27, 2015, 2:56 PM), http://www.
motherjones.com/politics/2015/07/sandra-bland-bail-bond-system [https://perma.cc/QJN3-M84M] 
(detailing apparent suicide of defendant who could not afford $500 bail bond); Jennifer Gonnerman, 
Before the Law, NEW YORKER (Oct. 6, 2014), http://www.newyorker.com/magazine/2014/10/06/
before-the-law (exploring three years defendant spent in jail because he could not afford bail after 
being accused of stealing book bag). 
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afford bail.15 States like New Jersey and California have similar or higher lev-
els of pretrial detainees who cannot afford their set bail.16 The inability to post 
bail can substantially impact the life of an arrested individual, resulting in loss 
of income and in some instances, the loss of jobs, housing, and custody of 
children.17 With national attention focused on the criminal justice system, these 
unsettling statistics have made national headlines.18 
Over the past fifty years, there have been several attempts at widespread 
bail reform.19 Several major cities and some states are leading reform efforts in 
this area.20 These various reform efforts have focused on ensuring that defend-
ants who represent a danger to the community are detained prior to trial and 
that insolvency is not the only factor that determines whether a defendant stays 
                                                                                                                           
 15 See Civil Liberties Union Press Release, supra note 14. 
 16 See April M. Short, In America, Innocent Until Proven Guilty? Not for Most People Who Are 
Stuck in Jail, TRUTHOUT (Dec. 29, 2013, 3:38 PM), http://www.truth-out.org/news/item/20914-in-
america-innocent-until-proven-guilty-not-for-most-people-who-are-stuck-in-jail [https://perma.cc/
9GY2-3NJW]. In California, 60 to 70% percent of the inmates in jail are pretrial defendants. See id. In 
New Jersey, about 40% of the jail population is eligible to post bail but cannot afford to do so. See id.; 
see also Press Release, Drug Policy Alliance, First-of-Its-Kind New Report Finds New Jersey Jails 
Packed with Pretrial Inmates Unable to Pay Often Nominal Bail Amounts (Apr. 8, 2013), http://
www.drugpolicy.org/news/2013/04/first-its-kind-new-report-finds-new-jersey-jails-packed-pretrial-
inmates-unable-pay-oft [https://perma.cc/P3QN-CXUM] (stating that on any given day, nearly 75% of 
the 15,000 individuals in New Jersey jails are awaiting trial rather than serving a sentence). 
 17 See Rachel Lu, Go Directly to Jail, We’ll Collect $2,000, FEDERALIST (Oct. 21, 2015), 
http://thefederalist.com/2015/10/21/go-directly-to-jail-well-collect-2000 [https://perma.cc/FX7K-
B9K6] (noting that the ability to pay bail can be the difference between a defendant keeping their job 
or losing it, and can save a defendant’s children from foster care or result in loss of custody). 
 18 See Daniela Altimari, Malloy Proposes Reforming State’s Bail System, HARTFORD COURANT 
(Nov. 5, 2015, 6:22 PM), http://www.courant.com/politics/hc-bail-bond-reform-20151105-story.html 
[https://perma.cc/A2CZ-TK8E] (discussing the Connecticut governor’s intention to overhaul the 
state’s bail system); Shaila Dewan, Court by Court, Lawyers Fight Policies That Fall Heavily on the 
Poor, N.Y. TIMES (Oct. 23, 2015), http://www.nytimes.com/2015/10/24/us/court-by-court-lawyers-
fight-practices-that-punish-the-poor.html?_r=0 [https://perma.cc/HAS6-DVK4] (exploring lawsuits 
brought in small cities focused on unconstitutional bail schedule practices); Darren Hutchinson, 
There’s Never Been a Better Time for Bail Reform, WASH. POST (July 20, 2015), https://www.
washingtonpost.com/posteverything/wp/2015/07/20/theres-never-been-a-better-time-for-bail-reform/ 
[https://perma.cc/J35Y-87P3] (discussing the national reform movement and how prolonged pretrial 
detention due to one’s inability to make bail affects the justice system). 
 19 See Bail Reform Act of 1984, Pub. L. No. 98-473, 98 Stat. 1976; District of Columbia Court 
Reform and Criminal Procedure Act of 1970, Pub. L. No. 91-358, 84 Stat. 473; Federal Bail Reform 
Act of 1966, Pub. L. No. 89-465, 80 Stat. 214. 
 20 See N.J. STAT. ANN. §§ 2A:162-15 to -22 (West Supp. 2015); Rick Rojas, New York City to 
Relax Bail Requirements for Low-Level Offenders, N.Y. TIMES (July 8, 2015), http://www.nytimes.
com/2015/07/09/nyregion/new-york-city-introduces-bail-reform-plan-for-low-level-offenders.html 
[https://perma.cc/RF62-S2FX] (detailing New York City’s proposed bail reform); see also Daniela 
Altimari, Gov. Malloy Proposes Elimination of Bail for Some Offenders, HARTFORD COURANT (Jan. 
28, 2016, 7:50 PM), http://www.courant.com/politics/hc-second-chance-malloy-20160128-story.html 
[https://perma.cc/2H7V-7MQG]. 
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in jail prior to trial.21 Despite attempts to ensure that a defendant’s lack of 
funds does not solely determine pretrial detention, the current bail system, in 
many cases, ensures just that.22 Special interest groups, specifically the bail 
bond industry, oppose reform efforts that aim to decrease the use of money as a 
way to secure pretrial release.23 As a result, defendants unable to pay the full 
amount of bail or a percentage of the bail to a bail bondsman or the court, in 
some jurisdictions, can spend weeks, months, and sometimes years detained 
while awaiting their day in court.24 
This Note argues that in order for bail to be administered fairly and justly, 
two important changes must occur.25 First, commercial bail bonds should be 
eliminated in favor of a system in which cash bail is not the default method of 
securing pretrial release.26 Second, all states should establish pretrial services 
agencies that aid courts in making bail determinations.27 
                                                                                                                           
 21 See NAT’L CONFERENCE ON BAIL AND CRIMINAL JUSTICE, PROCEEDINGS AND INTERIM RE-
PORT 297 (1965). In May of 1964, U.S. Attorney General Robert Kennedy convened the National 
Conference on Bail and Criminal Justice to analyze and discuss specific and workable alternatives to 
monetary bail. See id. at xiv. The conference discussed pretrial topics involving release on recogni-
zance, release on police summons, setting high money bail bonds to prevent pretrial release for public 
safety purposes (“preventative detention”), pretrial release based on money or other conditions gener-
ally, and pretrial release of juveniles. Id. at 296; see also 18 U.S.C §§ 3141–3156 (2012) (amending 
the 1966 Act to include consideration the of danger of a defendant in the determination of bail). 
 22 See Nick Pinto, The Bail Trap, N.Y. TIMES MAG. (Aug. 13, 2015), http://www.nytimes.com/
2015/08/16/magazine/the-bail-trap.html [https://perma.cc/43QJ-5XJN] (describing the evolution of 
bail from an emancipatory measure to “a trap door” for defendants who are unable to afford their set 
bail amount); see also Dan Kopf, America’s Peculiar Bail System, PRICEONOMICS (May 26, 2015), 
http://priceonomics.com/americas-peculiar-bail-system/ [https://perma.cc/46HZ-U9N7] (describing 
bail as a “regressive tax” for poor defendants); Short, supra note 16 (noting that forty percent of peo-
ple in New Jersey’s jails are eligible for bail but cannot afford bail). 
 23 See Shane Bauer, Inside the Wild, Shadowy, and Highly Lucrative Bail Industry, MOTHER JONES 
(2014), http://www.motherjones.com/politics/2014/06/bail-bond-prison-industry [https://perma.cc/J2BN-
ET7Y] (noting that prior to lobbying by the bail bondsman lobby, commercial bail made up twenty-
three percent of pretrial releases nationally but now makes up forty-nine percent); Sullivan, supra note 
3 (explaining the actions of the bail bondsmen’s lobby to eliminate PSAs in Broward County and how 
lobbies in other states are undertaking similar measures); see also supra notes 1–13 and accompany-
ing text (describing the efforts of a bail bondsman association to defund and decrease the efforts of 
Broward County’s PSAs that rely on alternatives to cash bail to secure pretrial release). 
 24 See OPEN SOC’Y JUSTICE INITIATIVE, THE SOCIOECONOMIC IMPACT OF PRETRIAL DETENTION 
16 (2011) (listing the national pretrial population at 476,000 in 2011); Shima Baradaran, The State of 
Pretrial Detention, in THE STATE OF CRIMINAL JUSTICE 2011, at 187, 190 (Myrna S. Raeder ed., 
2011) (estimating that there are 500,000 total pretrial detainees in the United States). Between October 
1, 2003, and September 30, 2004, federal defendants who were detained pretrial because they could 
not afford bail and whose cases were eventually terminated spent an average of 71.2 days in jail. BU-
REAU OF JUSTICE STATISTICS, COMPENDIUM OF FEDERAL JUSTICE STATISTICS, 2004, at 55 tbl.3.11 
(Dec. 2006). 
 25 See infra notes 178–216 and accompanying text. 
 26 See infra notes 191–204 and accompanying text. 
 27 See infra notes 205–216 and accompanying text. 
1342 Boston College Law Review [Vol. 57:1337 
Part I of this Note provides a brief history of bail in the United States.28 
Part II details previous bail reform efforts.29 Part III reviews the current bail pol-
icies of cities and states in the United States and explores how PSAs have been 
used to eliminate reliance on commercial bail bonds and incorporate alternative 
release methods.30 Part IV argues that all states should abolish commercial bail 
bonds in favor of a pretrial release system centered around PSAs.31 
I. AN OVERVIEW OF BAIL IN THE UNITED STATES 
American courts have used bail since as early as the 1600s.32 Bail has 
evolved from merely a mechanism to secure a defendant’s pretrial release into 
a mechanism intended to secure the subsequent appearance of the defendant, 
taking into account the flight risk of a defendant and his or her potential dan-
gerousness.33 This evolution was accomplished through the passage of distinct 
pieces of federal legislation that reflected changes also occurring on the state 
level.34 This Part presents an overview of the use of bail in the United States.35 
Section A explores the impact of bail decisions on the criminal justice pro-
cess.36 Section B details the mechanics of bail.37 
                                                                                                                           
 28 See infra notes 32–77 and accompanying text. 
 29 See infra notes 78–101 and accompanying text. 
 30 See infra notes 107–177 and accompanying text. 
 31 See infra notes 178–216 and accompanying text. 
 32 See Caleb Foote, The Coming Constitutional Crisis in Bail: I and II, 113 U. PA. L. REV. 959, 
967 (1965). In 1641, Massachusetts passed its Body of Liberties, creating an unequivocal right to bail 
for non-capital cases and rewriting the list of capital cases. See id. at 975. In 1682, Pennsylvania 
adopted a provision in its constitution that was more liberal than Massachusetts, by stating that “‘all 
prisoners shall be Bailable by Sufficient Sureties, unless for capital Offenses, where proof is evident 
or the presumption great.’” See June Carbone, Seeing Through the Emperor’s New Clothes: Rediscov-
ery of Basic Principles in the Administration of Bail, 34 SYRACUSE L. REV. 517, 531 (1983) (quoting 
5 AMERICAN CHARTERS 3061 (F. Thorpe ed., 1909)). Bail is “security such as cash, a bond, or prop-
erty . . . required by a court for the release of a criminal defendant who must appear in court at a future 
time.” See Bail, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (10th ed. 2014). 
 33 See Carbone, supra note 32, at 517 (articulating factors considered in bail determinations and 
how the determinations reflect the flight risk and dangerousness of the defendants). 
 34 Compare Federal Bail Reform Act of 1966 (creating a presumption of release on a defendant’s 
own recognizance for pretrial release in noncapital cases), with Bail Reform Act of 1984 (amending 
the Federal Bail Reform Act of 1966 to create a presumption of detention for certain crimes due to the 
presumptive flight risk and dangerousness of a defendant). 
 35 See infra notes 32–77 and accompanying text. 
 36 See infra notes 38–64 and accompanying text. 
 37 See infra notes 65–77 and accompanying text. 
2016] Eliminating the Use of Commercial Bail Bondsmen 1343 
A. Impact of Bail Decisions on the Criminal Justice Process 
In the United States, approximately 780,000 individuals are incarcerated 
in local jails without an actual conviction.38 Although they may eventually be 
found not guilty, these defendants still face the damaging effects of an often-
prolonged period of incarceration.39 Determining bail is usually the first deci-
sion made by a judge and has a significant effect on the outcome of a case.40 
Subsection 1 reviews the effects that bail decisions have on the outcome 
of criminal cases.41 Subsection 2 provides an overview of what factors most 
affect bail decisions.42 
1. Pretrial Detention’s Effects on Justice & Outcome 
Pretrial bail decisions influence every subsequent step in the criminal jus-
tice process.43 Defendants that cannot afford their set bail continue to be de-
tained.44 Research has shown that offenders who are detained during pretrial 
proceedings are more likely to be convicted, are less likely to have their charg-
es reduced, and are likely to have longer sentences than those who were re-
leased before trial.45 Pretrial detention also increases the likelihood that a de-
                                                                                                                           
 38 See Peter Wagner & Leah Sakala, Mass Incarceration: The Whole Pie, PRISON POLICY INITIA-
TIVE (2014), http://www.prisonpolicy.org/reports/pie.html [https://perma.cc/6H76-KFGT]; see also 
GERHARD FALK, THE AMERICAN CRIMINAL JUSTICE SYSTEM: HOW IT WORKS, HOW IT DOESN’T, 
AND HOW TO FIX IT 2 (2010) (stating that the number of Americans in local jails is 780,000); Solo-
mon Moore, Prison Spending Outpaces All But Medicaid, N.Y. TIMES (Mar. 2, 2009), http://www.
nytimes.com/2009/03/03/us/03prison.html [https://perma.cc/75H9-9JH6] (describing the spending for 
housing 780,000 prisoners in jails across the United States). 
 39 See OPEN SOC’Y JUSTICE INITIATIVE, supra note 24, at 3 (articulating the lingering societal 
effects of prolonged pretrial detention); Samuel R. Wiseman, Pretrial Detention and the Right to Be 
Monitored, 123 YALE L.J. 1344, 1346–47 (2014) (describing the effects of pretrial detention). 
 40 See Montag, supra note 15 (exploring how bail decisions can result in reduced outcomes dur-
ing pretrial detentions). See generally Marian R. Williams, The Effect of Pretrial Detention on Impris-
onment Decisions, CRIM. JUST. REV., Autumn 2003, at 299 (exploring how pretrial detention affects 
case disposition for pretrial detainees). 
 41 See infra notes 43–55 and accompanying text. 
 42 See infra notes 56–64 and accompanying text. 
 43 See Kopf, supra note 22 (examining how the inability to secure bail leads to pretrial detention); 
Robert Lewis, No Bail Money Keeps Poor People Behind Bars, WNYC (Sept. 19, 2013), http://www.
wnyc.org/story/bail-keeps-poor-people-behind-bars/ [https://perma.cc/SK7L-63DJ] (describing the 
process by which people attempt to secure enough money for bail). 
 44 See Adam Liptak, Illegal Globally, Bail for Profit Remains in U.S., N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 29, 2008, 
at A1. 
 45 See generally MARY PHILLIPS, N.Y.C. CRIMINAL JUSTICE AGENCY, INC., BAIL, DETENTION, 
AND FELONY CASE OUTCOMES (2008) [hereinafter PHILLIPS, BAIL, DETENTION, AND FELONY] (ex-
ploring the differences in outcomes for felony defendants that have been detained pretrial and those 
who have not been detained); MARY PHILLIPS, N.Y.C. CRIMINAL JUSTICE AGENCY, INC., PRETRIAL 
DETENTION AND CASE OUTCOMES, PART I: NONFELONY CASES (2007) [hereinafter PHILLIPS, PRE-
TRIAL DETENTION] (exploring the differences in outcomes for nonfelony defendants that have been 
detained pretrial and those who have not been detained). 
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fendant will plead guilty.46 Therefore, the bail decision process can have sig-
nificantly adverse effects on defendants who have not been released before 
trial.47 
The difference in case outcomes has been seen in both felony and non-
felony cases.48 In felony cases, the overall conviction rate is 68%.49 Among 
defendants detained longer than a week, this rate rises to 85% and for defend-
ants who were detained for less than a day the rate drops to 59%.50 For non-
felony cases, the overall conviction rate is 58%; that rate rises to 92% for de-
fendants who were detained and drops to 50% for defendants who were not 
detained.51 
Bail outcomes also affect the likelihood of a jail or prison sentence after 
conviction.52 For felony cases, the incarnation rate is 57%.53 For pretrial de-
tainees, this rate rises to 87% compared to 20% for defendants who were not 
detained prior to trial.54 For nonfelony cases, the incarnation rate is 32%, 
whereas among these cases, the incarceration rate for pretrial detainees is 84% 
but in the case of defendants that were not pretrial detainees, the incarceration 
rate is only 10%.55 
2. Factors That Affect Bail Decisions 
Ideally, bail decisions will release defendants under the least onerous 
conditions available and eliminate pretrial failures such as failure to appear or 
                                                                                                                           
 46 See HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, THE PRICE OF FREEDOM: BAIL AND PRETRIAL DETENTION OF 
LOW INCOME NONFELONY DEFENDANTS IN NEW YORK CITY 2 (2010) (noting that the threat of pre-
trial confinement prompts defendants to plead guilty and give up their right to trial); Steven Clarke & 
Susan Kurtz, The Importance of Interim Decisions to Felony Trial Court Dispositions, 74 J. CRIM. L. 
& CRIMINOLOGY 476, 478 (1983); Pinto, supra note 22 (arguing that the current bail system encour-
ages defendants who cannot afford bail to plead guilty). 
 47 See Pinto, supra note 22 (demonstrating the disparity in outcomes for defendants who are de-
tained prior to trial). Pretrial detention is the highest predictor of conviction when controlling for all 
other related factors. See id. According to a 2012 report by the New York City Criminal Justice Agen-
cy, only half of defendants in nonfelony cases were convicted if they were not subjected to pretrial 
detention compared to ninety-two percent of defendants who were subject to pretrial detainment. See 
id. 
 48 Compare PHILLIPS, BAIL, DETENTION, AND FELONY, supra note 45, at 2–6 (investigating the 
relationship between bail decisions and outcomes in felony cases), with PHILLIPS, PRETRIAL DETEN-
TION, supra note 45, at 25–29 (exploring how bail affects case outcomes in nonfelony cases). 
 49 See PHILLIPS, BAIL, DETENTION, AND FELONY, supra note 45, at 5. 
 50 See id. 
 51 See PHILLIPS, PRETRIAL DETENTION, supra note 45, at 25, 28. 
 52 See PHILLIPS, BAIL, DETENTION, AND FELONY, supra note 45, at 5; PHILLIPS, PRETRIAL DE-
TENTION, supra note 45, at 35. 
 53 See PHILLIPS, BAIL, DETENTION, AND FELONY, supra note 45, at 5. 
 54 See id. 
 55 See PHILLIPS, PRETRIAL DETENTION, supra note 45, at 38. 
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violations of the conditions of pretrial release.56 These decisions require judges 
to weigh the rights of the defendant against the safety of the community.57 
When making bail decisions, judges often base their decisions on input from 
members of the community and the criminal justice system.58 Such input theo-
retically ensures that decisions are consistent with knowledge about the risks 
posed by the defendant and the potential effect of his or her release on the 
community.59 
Concerns about crime control and community safety, however, have rein-
forced particular labels about crime and criminality.60 
For instance, multiple studies have assessed whether race and ethnicity af-
fect decisions to grant bail and to release defendants before trial, finding that 
race and ethnicity play a significant role in bail decisions.61 These analyses 
have found that racial disparities are significant and have been stable over 
time.62 
                                                                                                                           
 56 See 18 U.S.C. § 3142 (2012) (mandating that a defendant subject to conditions of bail must be 
given “the least restrictive further condition, or combination of conditions” to assure his or her reap-
pearance in court and the safety of the community); JOHN CLARK, A FRAMEWORK FOR IMPLEMENT-
ING EVIDENCE-BASED PRACTICES IN PRETRIAL SERVICES 3 (2008) (describing factors for a judge to 
consider when making bail decisions). 
 57 See CLARK, supra note 56, at 3 (describing how pretrial services assess flight risk and danger-
ousness to the community prior to making a bail recommendation to a judge); see also 18 U.S.C. 
§§ 3141–3150 (allowing courts to use potential danger to the community as a factor in considering 
conditions of release). 
 58 See MARY PHILLIPS, A DECADE OF BAIL RESEARCH IN NEW YORK CITY 57 (2012) (acknowl-
edging the large role a prosecutor’s bail recommendation plays on a judge’s bail determination). Con-
trolling for other relevant factors related to bail determination, a prosecutor’s bail request was the 
strongest predictor of a judge’s bail determination. See id.; see also CLARK, supra note 56, at 28 (not-
ing that consideration is given to the effects that conditions imposed on a defendant will have on other 
members of the community). 
 59 See CLARK, supra note 56, at 3 (noting that pretrial services officers gather information to 
effectuate the best bail decision for defendants). See generally Scott Spivak, Prosecutor’s Role in Bail 
Reform, N.Y. LAW J., Mar. 6, 2013, at 6 (exploring the role of a prosecutor’s bail recommendation). 
 60 See George S. Bridges et al., Crime, Social Structure and Criminal Punishment: White and 
Nonwhite Rates of Imprisonment, 34 SOC. PROBLEMS 345, 351 (1987) (noting that factors other than 
those enumerated for a judge to consider often drive decisions within the criminal justice system). 
 61 See Marvin D. Free, Jr., Race and Presentencing Decisions in the United States: A Summary 
and Critique of the Research, 27 CRIM. JUST. REV. 203, 221 (2002) (exploring how race affects pre-
trial decisions). 
 62 See Traci Schlesinger, Racial and Ethnic Disparity in Pretrial Criminal Processing, 22 JUST. 
Q. 170, 187 (2005) (“Judges use racialized attributions to fill in the knowledge gaps created by limited 
information on cases and defendants. Through this process, racial and ethnic stereotypes become per-
tinent ‘knowledge’ that direct criminal justice decisions.”); Christine Tartaro & Christopher M. 
Sedelmaier, A Tale of Two Counties: The Impact of Pretrial Release, Race and Ethnicity upon Sen-
tencing Decisions, 22 CRIM. JUST. STUD. 203, 218 (2009) (arguing that the race and ethnicity of a 
defendant often act as shorthand for perceived dangerousness and flight risk when no other infor-
mation is available for bail decisions); see also K.B. Turner & James B. Johnson, A Comparison of 
Bail Amounts for Hispanics, Whites, and African Americans: A Single County Analysis, 30 AM. J. 
CRIM. JUST. 35, 50 (2005) (finding that higher bail amounts for Latino defendants were perhaps at-
tributable to negative stereotypes); John Wooldredge, Distinguishing Race Effects on Pre-Trial Re-
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Though race and socioeconomic status play a significant role in bail deci-
sions, severity of the offense and prior record seem to be the strongest predic-
tors of pretrial release decisions.63 Additionally, factors indicating the likeli-
hood of conviction, such as blameworthiness and the need to protect the com-
munity, significantly influence whether a suspect will be granted release, and if 
so, what amount of bail will be set.64 
B. The Mechanics of Bail 
When a person is arrested, a judge determines whether to offer pretrial re-
lease by setting bail.65 Typically, a judge will set an amount of money that 
must be paid to the court before the defendant can be released.66 When setting 
bail, a judge has wide discretion to consider and weigh a myriad of factors.67 
Examples of such factors are the severity of the crime or the defendant’s con-
nection to the community.68 In some jurisdictions, however, judges have much 
less discretion and a bail schedule is predetermined.69 
                                                                                                                           
lease and Sentencing Decisions, 29 JUST. Q. 41, 67 (2012) (noting that at an initial court appearance, a 
judge’s “attempt to assess an offender’s risk for flight and dangerousness to the community with little 
available information” could lead to “considerations of criminal stereotypes”). 
 63 See JOHN GOLDKAMP & MICHAEL R. GOTTFREDSON, POLICY GUIDELINES FOR BAIL: AN EX-
PERIMENT IN COURT REFORM 15 (1985) (demonstrating that prior record and severity of crime signif-
icantly predict bail determination); JENNIFER HEDLUND & KATHLEEN BANTLEY, THE DEVELOPMENT 
OF GUIDELINES FOR FINANCIAL BOND RECOMMENDATIONS 3 (2009) (indicating that the severity of 
the charged offense was the most significant predictor of the amount of bail set); Curtis E.A. Karnow, 
Setting Bail for Public Safety, 13 BERKELEY J. CRIM. L. 1, 10 (2008) (noting that severity of the 
charged offense is often the most decisive factor in a judge’s bail determination). 
 64 See Brian Montopoli, Is the U.S. Bail System Unfair?, CBS NEWS (Feb. 8, 2013, 1:20 PM), 
http://www.cbsnews.com/news/is-the-us-bail-system-unfair/ [https://perma.cc/EK75-GJL8] (discuss-
ing the bail process and the mechanics of the system of bail); Bail Basics: What Bail Is, How It Works, 
MASS. COURT SYS., http://www.mass.gov/courts/selfhelp/criminal-law/bail-basics.html [https://
perma.cc/XY34-F4UT] (describing the bail process and noting the determining factors of bail). 
 65 See Montopoli, supra note 64 (discussing the bail process and the mechanics of bail); In Court 
Bail Process, MASS. COURT SYS., http://www.mass.gov/courts/selfhelp/criminal-law/in-court-bail.
html [https://perma.cc/VLD9-VU6D] (describing the process of bail determination in Massachusetts). 
 66 See Karnow, supra note 63, at 3 (describing the procedure by which a judge makes a bail de-
termination); In Court Bail Process, supra note 65 (articulating how the bail process occurs in Massa-
chusetts court proceedings). 
 67 See Karnow, supra note 63, at 3 (describing the factors that judges use when deciding what to 
set as the conditions of release). 
 68 See id. The judge will also take into account the defendant’s prior criminal record as well as 
any past instances in which the defendant failed to appear in court. See id. Other factors include flight 
risk and the defendant’s potential danger to the community. See id. 
 69 See Lindsey Carlson, Bail Schedules: A Violation of Judicial Discretion?, CRIM. JUST., Spring 
2011, at 12 (exploring the use of bail schedules and how they operate to curtail judicial discretion); 
see, e.g., CAL. R. CT. 4.102 (laying out standard bail amounts for certain offenses in California). 
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After the amount of bail has been set, a defendant can give cash, a bond, 
or property to a court to cover the amount of bail and secure pretrial release.70 
If the defendant subsequently fails to appear in court, the court may keep the 
bail amount and issue a warrant for the defendant’s arrest.71 If, however, the 
defendant appears in court as required, the bail amount will be returned at the 
conclusion of the case.72 
There are several different methods to secure release.73 The most common 
method of release in the United States involves commercial bail bondsmen.74 
The arrested individual will pay the bail bondsmen a fee, usually a percentage 
of the entire bail amount.75 The bail bondsmen will then pay the entire amount 
of bail to the court to secure the individual’s release.76 Unlike other methods of 
securing pretrial release, even if the defendant meets his or her requisite ap-
pearances in court, and even if the defendant is ultimately found not guilty, the 
bail bondsman keeps the fee.77 
                                                                                                                           
 70 See Kopf, supra note 22 (examining factors of the United States’ bail system that make it 
unique from that of other countries); Lewis, supra note 43 (describing the use of property and money 
to secure the release of a detained defendant). 
 71 See 18 U.S.C. § 3146 (2012) (noting that the punishment for failure to appear before court as 
required is forfeiture of any property given to secure release); Montopoli, supra note 64 (explaining 
the consequences of posting bail and then failing to attend subsequent court appearances). 
 72 See Montopoli, supra note 64 (explaining the return of bail process at the end of a case); In 
Court Bail Process, supra note 65 (stating that bail is returned at the end of a trial if the defendant 
attends all required court hearings and trials). 
 73 See, e.g., PA. RULE CRIM. P. 524 (describing the types of bail bonds available to secure pretrial 
release). Release on recognizance, unsecured bonds, and secured bonds are examples of methods of 
securing pretrial release. See id. Release on recognizance is “the pretrial release of an arrested person 
who promises, usually in writing but without supplying a surety or posting bond, to appear for trial at 
a later date.” Release on Recognizance, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (10th ed. 2014). An unsecured 
bond is “a bond that holds a defendant liable for a breach of the bond’s conditions (such as failure to 
appear in court), but that is not secured by a deposit of or lien on property.” Unsecured Bail Bond, 
BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (10th ed. 2014). 
 74 See Karnow, supra note 64, at 4 (noting that bail bondsmen are used as a method to secure 
pretrial release); Kopf, supra note 22 (exploring the place of bail bondsmen in the U.S. bail system). 
 75 See Karnow, supra note 64, at 4 (explaining role of bail bondsmen and how they are compen-
sated); Kopf, supra note 22 (exploring the role of bail bondsmen in the U.S. bail system). 
 76 See Karnow, supra note 64, at 4 (describing how bail bondsmen secure the release of detained 
a defendant); Kopf, supra note 22 (demonstrating the role of bail bondsmen in assuring the release of 
a detained defendant). 
 77 See Karnow, supra note 64, at 4 (noting that the fee paid to bail bondsmen is not returned to a 
defendant at the conclusion of a case); Kopf, supra note 22 (stating that a bail bondsman does not 
return the fee paid to them by a detained defendant). 
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II. AN OVERVIEW OF PREVIOUS BAIL REFORM EFFORTS  
IN THE UNITED STATES 
Over the years, the U.S. bail system has been the target of much criticism 
and many reform efforts.78 A 1927 study, The Bail System in Chicago, publi-
cized the inequities of the bail system and explored the possibility of using 
alternatives to commercial bail to effectuate pretrial release.79 The study con-
cluded that the system neither guaranteed security to the community nor safe-
guarded the rights of defendants.80 The study recommended increased use of 
summons to avoid unnecessary arrests, and fact-finding investigations at the 
time of arrest so that bail determinations could be tailored to each individual 
situation.81 
In a series of decisions in the 1950s, the U.S. Supreme Court established 
some limits and protections in the use of bail.82 In 1951, in Stack v. Boyle and 
Carlson v. Landon, the U.S. Supreme Court established that bail cannot be ex-
cessive in violation of the Eighth Amendment, and that courts are not mandat-
ed to set a bail amount.83 Federal and state legislatures may determine bail’s 
parameters and what categories of crimes are entitled to bail.84 When legisla-
tures permit the use of bail bonds, however, there must be an individualized 
determination using standards designed to set the bail bond at “an amount rea-
                                                                                                                           
 78 See James Pinkerton & Lauren Caruba, Tough Bail Policies Punish the Poor and the Sick, 
Critics Say, HOUSTON CHRONICLE (Dec. 28, 2015, 1:17 PM), http://www.houstonchronicle.com/
news/houston-texas/houston/article/Tough-bail-policies-punish-the-poor-and-the-sick-6721984.php 
[http://perma.cc/AH9H-VARB] (describing problems with the bail system at Harris County Jail in 
Texas); Margaret Talbot, The Case Against Cash Bail, NEW YORKER (Aug. 25, 2015), http://www.
newyorker.com/news/news-desk/the-case-against-cash-bail [https://perma.cc/AH9H-VARB] (arguing 
for an elimination of cash bail as a way to address the problem of high incarceration rates). See gener-
ally JUSTICE POLICY INST., FOR BETTER OR FOR PROFIT: HOW THE BAIL BONDING INDUSTRY 
STANDS IN THE WAY OF FAIR AND EFFECTIVE PRETRIAL JUSTICE (2012) (arguing that the bail bond 
industry is an impediment to a fair and just system of bail administration). 
 79 See generally ARTHUR L. BEELEY, THE BAIL SYSTEM IN CHICAGO (1966). A 1929 study found 
that bail amounts were based solely on the alleged offense and that about twenty percent of the de-
fendants were unable to post bail. Id. at 23. The author of that study also noted that professional 
bondsmen played too important a role in the administration of the criminal justice system and reported 
a number of abuses by bondsmen, including their failure to pay the court for forfeited bonds in the 
case of defendants who fail to appear in court. See id. 
 80 See id. 
 81 See id. 
 82 See Carlson v. Landon, 342 U.S. 524, 545–46 (1952) (holding that the Eighth Amendment does 
not prevent Congress from defining the classes of cases in which bail will be allowed); Stack v. Boyle, 
342 U.S. 1, 3 (1951) (examining the constitutionality of seemingly excessive bail set by a trial court). 
 83 See Carlson, 342 U.S. at 546–47 (noting that it is within Congress’s powers to limit the types 
of crimes for which courts are entitled to set bail); Stack, 342 U.S. at 3 (interpreting the Eighth 
Amendment to mean that bail may not be set greater than necessary to ensure the presence of a de-
fendant at trial and possibly to establish an underlying right to bail). 
 84 See Carlson, 342 U.S. at 546–47 
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sonably calculated” to insure the defendant’s return to court.85 When the pur-
pose of a bail bond is only to prevent flight, the monetary amount must be set 
only as high as is necessary to meet that goal.86 
In 1966, Congress reacted to criticisms similar to those in the 1927 Chi-
cago study, and passed the Federal Bail Reform Act of 1966.87 Generally, the 
1966 Act provided that non-capital defendants were to be released pending 
trial on their personal recognizance unless a judicial officer determined that 
such release did not adequately ensure a defendant’s appearance at trial.88 In 
those cases, the 1966 Act mandated that a judge choose the least restrictive 
alternatives from a list of conditions designed to secure a defendant’s appear-
ance.89 In contrast, the 1966 Act set the bail of defendants charged with a capi-
tal offense through a different standard that took into account public safety.90 
For capital defendants, judges could also consider concerns regarding a de-
fendant’s potential danger to the community in addition to the likelihood of a 
defendant’s flight.91 
Despite passage of the 1966 Act, the bail reform movement declined con-
siderably by the late 1960s.92 Few of the early pretrial continued to operates, 
and those that did faced minimal financial support from the government.93 Be-
cause there was no mechanism for gathering background information on de-
fendants detailed in the 1966 Act, in 1974, Congress created ten pilot pretrial 
agencies within the federal courts to provide judges with the information nec-
                                                                                                                           
 85 See Stack, 342 U.S. at 3–4 (noting that bail’s function is limited and can only be set to ensure 
the presence of a defendant at court appearances). 
 86 See id. 
 87 See Federal Bail Reform Act of 1966, Pub. L. No. 89-465, 80 Stat. 214. The 1966 Act con-
tained the following provisions: (1) a presumption in favor of releasing non-capital defendants on 
their own recognizance; (2) conditional pretrial release with conditions imposed to reduce the risk of 
failure to appear; and (3) review of bail bonds for defendants detained for twenty-four hours or more. 
Id. 
 88 See id. § 3146 (2012) (explaining the conditions of release in noncapital cases). 
 89 See id. 
 90 See id. § 3148 (describing the conditions of release in capital cases). 
 91 See id. After passage of the Federal Bail Reform Act of 1966, many states passed similar stat-
utes. See WAYNE H. THOMAS, JR., BAIL REFORM IN AMERICA 162 (1976). By 1971, at least thirty-six 
states had enacted statutes authorizing the release of defendants on their own recognizance. See id. 
 92 See id. at 161–70 (exploring the effects of the 1966 Act on bail administration). 
 93 See id. at 5. An example of an early failure of PSAs is a case against the Harris County, Texas, 
Pretrial Release Agency, in which a federal court acted to remedy “severe and inhumane overcrowd-
ing of inmates” at the Harris County jail. See Alberti v. Sheriff of Harris Cty., 406 F. Supp. 649 (S.D. 
Tex. 1975). Despite early success, the federal court found the county’s PSA to be “foundering” and 
“ineffective” in 1975. See id. at 651. Several reasons contributed to the failure of the agency, such as 
harassment and sabotage by commercial bail bondsmen, inefficient physical placement, and the agen-
cy’s inadequate budget and personnel. See id. To help resolve the agency’s shortcomings, the court 
ordered it to adopt an objective point system for evaluating release on recognizance. See id. The court 
intended the new system to adopt a meaningful objective standard to determine release decisions. See 
id. at 653. 
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essary to make release decisions.94 As a result of this pilot program, Congress 
passed the Pretrial Services Act of 1982, which established pretrial services 
agencies in federal district courts.95 
Although pretrial services programs somewhat grew after the 1966 Act, a 
new debate over the administration of bail began.96 Heightened public concern 
over crimes committed by defendants released on bail ushered in a new era in 
bail reform.97 In 1984, Congress passed the Comprehensive Crime Control Act 
of 1984.98 Chapter I of that Act contained the Bail Reform Act of 1984, which 
amended the 1966 Act to include a requirement that judicial officers consider 
the potential danger of a defendant in order to address “the alarming problem 
of crimes committed by persons on release.”99 The 1984 Act was the last major 
piece of legislation to address the administration of bail at the federal level.100 
Many states adopted similar statutes.101 
                                                                                                                           
 94 See JOHN CLARK & D. ALAN HENRY, U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, PRETRIAL SERVICES PRO-
GRAMMING AT THE START OF THE 21ST CENTURY: A SURVEY OF PRETRIAL SERVICES PROGRAMS 2 
(2003). The agencies, following and expanding on approaches initially developed by pretrial services 
projects in state court systems, developed strong support from judges and magistrates in the pilot 
districts. See id.; see also 18 U.S.C. §§ 3141–3151 (2012). 
 95 See Pretrial Services Act of 1982, Pub. L. No. 97-267, Sect. 2, 96 Stat. 1136 (codified at 18 
U.S.C. § 3152). 
 96 See PRETRIAL SERVS. RESOURCE CTR., THE SUPERVISED PRETRIAL RELEASE PRIMER 5 (1999) 
(describing the bail reform movement that occurred in the 1970s after passage of the 1966 Act). 
 97 See id. Under the 1966 Act, only defendants charged with capital offenses could be detained if 
the court found that “no one condition or combination of conditions will reasonably assure that the 
person will not flee or pose a danger to any other person or the community.” See 80 Stat. at 215–16; 
see also PRETRIAL SERVS. RESOURCE CTR., supra note 96, at 5. Judges were not authorized to consid-
er danger to the community for any other bailable defendants. See id. 
 98 See Bail Reform Act of 1984, Pub. L. No. 98-473, 98 Stat. 1976. 
 99 Id. The 1984 Act mandates “pretrial release of the person on personal recognizance, or upon 
execution of an unsecured appearance bond in an amount specified by the court . . . unless the judicial 
officer determines that such release will not reasonably assure the appearance of the person as re-
quired or will endanger the safety of any other person or the community.” See 83 Stat. at 1977. The 
Act further provides that if, after a hearing, “the judicial officer finds that no condition or combination 
of conditions will reasonably assure the appearance of the person and the safety of any other person 
and the community, such judicial officer shall order the detention of the person before trial.” Id. The 
Act also creates a rebuttable presumption toward confinement when the person has committed certain 
delineated offenses, such as crimes of violence or serious drug crimes. See id. 
 100 See 18 U.S.C. §§ 3141–3151. The 1984 Act faced a challenge in the U.S. Supreme Court in 
1987 in United States v. Salerno, in which a defendant challenged the constitutionality of the provi-
sion allowing courts to consider dangerousness in making its bail determination. See 481 U.S. 739 
(1987). The Court determined that the 1984 Act did not violate the Due Process Clause of the Fifth 
Amendment, nor the Excessive Bail Clause of the Eighth Amendment to the U.S. Constitution. See id. 
at 755. Passage of the 1984 Act changed the landscape of bail administration. See GOV’T ACCOUNTING 
OFFICE, CRIMINAL BAIL: HOW BAIL REFORM IS WORKING IN SELECTED DISTRICT COURTS 1 (1987). 
The 1984 Act was not necessarily revolutionary in the ideas that it put forward. See id. Many statutes 
had already been implemented on the state level. See id. The Act instead legitimized states’ actions as 
the path that pretrial detention would be taking in the United States. See id. After passage of the Act, 
the amount of pretrial detainees increased. See id. A higher percentage of the defendants detained 
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Though widespread bail reform efforts have not resulted in legislative 
changes similar to that of the 1966 Act and the 1984 Act, recent court decisions 
demonstrate that bail reform efforts are very much ongoing.102 These efforts 
often focus on ensuring that indigent defendants are not held in pretrial deten-
tion merely because they cannot afford to pay bail.103 This position has recent-
ly been bolstered by an amicus curiae brief submitted by the U.S. Department 
of Justice (“DOJ”) in support of the plaintiff in Walker v. City of Calhoun, 
Georgia.104 In the brief, the DOJ argues that bail practices that “allow for the 
pretrial release of only those who can pay, without accounting for the ability to 
pay, unlawfully discriminate based on indigence.”105 Such a sweeping state-
ment point to a tide of change within the realm of bail reform.106 
III. HOW BAIL BONDSMEN AFFECT THE U.S. JUSTICE SYSTEM 
The rise of the industry of commercial bail bondsmen coincided with a 
rise in bail amounts.107 This increase in bail amounts also led to a higher per-
centage of defendants who were unable to afford bail and who remained in jail 
                                                                                                                           
pretrial were detained due to their perceived level of danger to the community. See id. Additionally, 
the amount of crimes committed by defendants out of jail on a bail bond decreased. See id. 
 101 See John S. Goldkamp, Danger and Detention: A Second Generation of Bail Reform, 76 J. 
CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 1, 15 (1985) (noting that prior to passage of the 1984 Act, twenty-three 
states already considered dangerousness in bail decisions and eleven states joined them after the 1984 
Act). 
 102 See Walker v. City of Calhoun, GA, No. 4:15-CV-0170-HLM, 2016 WL 361612, at *10 (N.D. 
Ga. Jan. 28, 2016) (noting that any bail law that does not consider the ability to pay violates Four-
teenth Amendment); United States v. Flowers, 946 F. Supp. 2d 1295, 1301 (M.D. Ala. 2013) (arguing 
that any sentence that is imposed solely because of indigence is unconstitutional); State v. Blake, 642 
So. 2d 959, 968 (Ala. 1994) (declaring bail law unconstitutional that, on it’s face, discriminated 
against the indigent). 
 103 See Editorial, Bail Reform for Indigent Suspects, N.Y. TIMES (Oct. 2, 2015), http://www.
nytimes.com/2015/10/03/opinion/bail-reform-for-indigent-suspects.html?_r=0 [https://perma.cc/
44QA-FV6U] (arguing that bail reform in general and more specifically in the case of indigent de-
fendants); Jason Salzman, Advocates Push Bail Reform to Stop “Penalizing People for Being Poor,” 
REWIRE (Oct. 2, 2011), https://rewire.news/article/2015/10/02/advocates-push-bail-reform-stop-
penalizing-people-poor/ [https://perma.cc/Q8F9-46Q8] (detailing bail reform efforts in Colorado cen-
tered around indigent defendants). 
 104 See generally Brief for the United States as Amicus Curiae Supporting Plaintiff-Appellee, 
Walker v. City of Calhoun, GA, No. 16-19521-HH (11th Cir Aug. 18, 2016) (detailing DOJ’s argu-
ment for affirmation of lower court’s decision to declare treatment of indigent plaintiff unconstitution-
al). 
 105 Id. at 18. 
 106 See infra note 103 and accompanying text (detailing reform efforts centered around indigent 
defendants). 
 107 See F.E. DEVINE, COMMERCIAL BAIL BONDING: A COMPARISON OF COMMON LAW ALTER-
NATIVES 26 (1991) (exploring the rise of bail amounts and the bail bondsman industry in the United 
States). 
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until the completion of their case.108 With jail overcrowding identified as a 
widespread problem, cities and states in the United States have explored ways 
in which they can decrease the jail population.109 In light of the high propor-
tion of jailed defendants who are merely awaiting trial and cannot afford bail, 
cities and states are investigating how bail is administered in an effort to de-
crease the number of people incarcerated.110 
This Part discusses how bail administration impacts the criminal justice 
system.111 Section A reviews the rise of the bail bonding industry and its effect 
on bail administration.112 Section B compares bail administration in states that 
have banned commercial bail bondsmen and states that have not.113 
A. The Rise of Bail Bondsmen and Their Effect on Bail 
As early as the 1920s, the U.S. commercial bail bond profession flour-
ished as a result of arbitrarily high bail amounts and a growing number of de-
fendants who were unable to pay these high amounts.114 By 1963, courts began 
to question a system that was based on secured bonds and dominated by com-
mercial bail bondsmen.115 The corrupt and sometimes abusive practices of bail 
bondsmen became the focus of inquiries.116 
                                                                                                                           
 108 See id. Other countries from common law traditions did not see this rise in bail bondsmen, due 
mostly to moving away from monetary bail. See id. Additionally, these countries, with the exception 
of the Philippines, banned profiting from bail bonds, which, of course, did not allow for an increase in 
the number of bail bondsmen. See id. 
 109 LEGISLATIVE ANALYST OFFICE, Reducing Prison Overcrowding in California (Aug. 5, 2011), 
http://www.lao.ca.gov/reports/2011/crim/overcrowding_080511.aspx [https://perma.cc/3U79-BPW9] 
(providing a status report on efforts to reduce jail overcrowding in California); Prison Overcrowding 
Walks ‘Alabama Down Road to Federal Intervention,’ Lawmaker Says, ALA. MEDIA (June 29, 2015, 
5:18 PM), http://www.al.com/news/index.ssf/2015/06/prison_overcrowding_walks_alab.html [https://
perma.cc/2KNM-5CMZ] (exploring the overcrowding of jails in Alabama and the possibility of inter-
vention from the federal government). 
 110 See Marcia Johnson & Luckett Anthony Johnson, Bail: Reforming Policies to Address Over-
crowded Jails, the Impact of Race on Detention, and Community Revival in Harris County, Texas, 7 
NW. J.L. & SOC. POL’Y 42 (2012) (exploring how bail policies can be reformed to alleviate over-
crowded prisons); Rebecca Davis O’Brien & Michelle Hackman, No-Bail Programs Aim to Relieve 
Jail Overcrowding, WALL ST. J. (July 8, 2015), http://www.wsj.com/articles/no-bail-programs-aim-to-
relieve-jail-overcrowding-1436402595 [http://perma.cc/Z59D-4PX6]. 
 111 See infra notes 107–177 and accompanying text. 
 112 See infra notes 114–132 and accompanying text. 
 113 See infra notes 133–177 and accompanying text. 
 114 See Shadd Maruna et al., Putting a Price on Prisoner Release: The History of Bail and a Pos-
sible Future of Parole, 14 PUNISHMENT & SOC’Y 315, 325–26 (2014) (describing the rise of the bail 
bonding industry and highlighting conditions that have allowed the industry to prosper over time); 
THOMAS, supra note 91, at 11–12 (analyzing the rise of commercial bail bondsmen). 
 115 See THOMAS, supra note 91, at 13 (describing bail reform efforts resulting from the rise of 
commercial bail bondsmen). 
 116 See id. at 15–16; see also NAT’L CONFERENCE ON BAIL AND CRIMINAL JUSTICE, supra note 
21, 240–46 (describing an Illinois bail reform plan that was a direct result of an investigation into the 
corrupt practices of the Illinois bail bonding industry). 
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Increased judicial reliance on personal recognizance bonds and PSAs for 
supervision of released defendants created friction between these agencies and 
the commercial bail bonding industry.117 To this day, this tension drives pro-
posed legislation on the administration of bail.118 In recent years, the struggle 
between commercial bail bondsmen and PSAs has taken place mostly in state 
legislatures, with intense fights in several states.119 
During the mid-1990s, commercial bail bond organizations, including the 
National Association of Bail Insurance Companies and various state bail or-
ganizations, worked with the American Legislative Exchange Council (“AL-
EC”) to create an initiative titled “Strike Back!”120 Strike Back was an aggres-
sive and concerted effort to eliminate pretrial services agencies and release on 
personal recognizance bond to promote the interests of the commercial surety 
industry.121 
Due in large part to campaigns led by bail bond industry lobbyists, some 
states have passed legislation that imposes burdensome administrative report-
                                                                                                                           
 117 See SPURGEON KENNEDY & D. ALAN HENRY, PRETRIAL SERVS. RES. CTR., COMMERCIAL 
SURETY BAIL: ASSESSING ITS ROLE IN THE PRETRIAL RELEASE AND DETENTION DECISION 2 (1996). 
 118 See Bruce Murphy, Bail Bond Bill Will Create Debtor’s Prisons, URBAN MILWAUKEE (May 
21, 2013, 12:45 PM), http://urbanmilwaukee.com/2013/05/21/murphys-law-bail-bond-bill-will-create-
debtors-prisons/ [https://perma.cc/G6VN-5LMJ] (arguing that legislation reintroducing commercial 
bail bondsmen into Wisconsin would result in an increased population of defendants remaining in 
prison due to an inability to afford bail); Marilyn Odendahl, Dispute Over Bail Bonds Likely to Pro-
duce a Legislative Solution, THEINDIANALAWYER.COM (July 31, 2013), http://www.theindiana
lawyer.com/dispute-over-bail-bonds-likely-to-produce-a-legislative-solution/PARAMS/article/32025 
[https://perma.cc/ND7B-24BX] (describing the tension between bail bondsmen and judges over the 
use of bail bonds that allow defendants to be released without the use of bail bondsmen). 
 119 See Tamara Dietrich, Bail Bill Would Punish Defendants for Not Being Poor, DAILYPRESS (Feb. 
2, 2010), http://articles.dailypress.com/2010-02-02/news/dp-local_tamara_0203feb03_1_pretrial-
defendants-bank-account [https://perma.cc/GS8U-9G3M] (exploring a Virginia law that would limit 
the use of pretrial services agencies to only indigent defendants). In Virginia, the for-profit bail bond 
industry unsuccessfully lobbied for passage of a bill that would significantly limit judicial discretion 
by requiring financial bonds in every criminal case unless the defendant was identified as indigent, 
and reduce state funding for Virginia’s pretrial services programs. See id. In Georgia, for-profit bail 
bonding interests successfully backed a bill that reduced the types of defendants who may be released 
to a pretrial services program with electronic monitoring. See H.B. 306, 150th Gen. Assemb., Reg. 
Sess. (Ga. 2009); PROF’L BAIL AGENTS OF THE U.S., 2009 PBUS MIDYEAR MEETING 3 (2009) (dis-
cussing Representative Len Walker’s efforts to push through legislation on behalf of Georgia’s bail 
agents). 
 120 See MICHAEL J. GILBERT & DAVID SCHICHOR, PRIVATIZATION OF CRIMINAL JUSTICE: PAST 
PRESENT AND FUTURE 320 (2001) (examining the effectiveness of the Strike Back! campaign in spe-
cific states). American Legislative Exchange Council (“ALEC”) is an organization consisting of “state 
legislators and conservative policy advocates” including corporations and trade associations such as 
the National Association of Bail Insurance Companies and the American Bail Coalition. 
 121 See id; see also Mark Kiesling & Kevin Corcoran, Lobbyists Pose as Reformers, NORTHWEST 
INDIANA TIMES (Mar. 29, 1998), http://www.nwitimes.com/uncategorized/lobbyists-pose-as-reformers/
article_46a8c63b-b79d-5015-a107-0132104e6129.html [https://perma.cc/3UE9-3UB2] (exploring the 
role of lobbyists involved in the Strike Back! campaign) 
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ing requirements on PSAs.122 Critics of this legislation argue that it is designed 
to displace pretrial services programs by imposing harsh administrative bur-
dens upon them such as stringent reporting standards. These same reporting 
standards are not required of commercial bail bondsmen despite both entities 
essentially serving the same function: securing the release of pretrial defend-
ants.123 These legislative attacks on pretrial services organizations are part of a 
national strategy promulgated by ALEC.124 
In 2008, Florida passed a law, entitled the Citizens’ Right to Know Act, 
which mirrored the language of ALEC’s proposed legislation of the same 
name.125 The law requires pretrial services programs to create reports on a 
weekly basis detailing information on each defendant they process.126 The law 
was passed on the premise that pretrial services programs needed greater 
transparency and accountability to the public by way of weekly reporting and 
tracking of results.127 The Citizens’ Right to Know Act is an example of AL-
EC’s strategy of using legislation to prevent government agencies from reduc-
ing reliance on commercial bail bonding through the use of PSAs.128 
These efforts are not specific to state-level legislation, such as the efforts 
of the bail bondsman industry in Broward County, Florida.129 A federal version 
                                                                                                                           
 122 See AM. LEGISLATIVE EXCH. COUNCIL, CITIZENS’ RIGHT TO KNOW: PRETRIAL RELEASE ACT 
(2014), http://www.alec.org/model-policy/citizens-right-to-know-pretrial-release-act/ [https://perma.
cc/V229-X8XU] (proposed language for bail reform legislation drafted by ALEC). 
 123 See Nichols, supra note 4 (exploring state efforts to regulate the bail industry). 
 124 See id. In the past, ALEC has supported efforts such as defeat of the Equal Rights Amendment 
and support of tobacco advertising. See id. ALEC has a justice reform platform, and part of that plat-
form revolves around the passage of laws related to the bail bonding industry. See id. 
 125 See FLA. STAT. ANN. § 907.043 (West Supp. 2012); see also MELANIE LEDGERWOOD, AC-
CREDITED SUR. & CAS. CO., PRETRIAL RELEASE AND CITIZENS’ RIGHT-TO-KNOW ACT (n.d.), https://
www.accredited-inc.com/pdf/summaries/Surety-Initiative-Template-Guide.pdf [https://perma.cc/
7QJM-PTEX] (detailing the policy of the Citizens’ Right to Know Act and reasons for its passage in 
Florida). 
 126 See FLA. STAT. ANN. § 907.043. Pretrial release programs are defined as “an entity, public or 
private, that conducts investigations of pretrial detainees, makes pretrial release recommendations to a 
court, and electronically monitors and supervises pretrial defendants. However, the term ‘pretrial 
release program’ shall not apply to the Department of Corrections.” Id. 
 127 See AM. LEGISLATIVE EXCH. COUNCIL, ALEC IN FLORIDA (2012), https://feaweb.org/_data/
files/ALEC/alecinflorida.pdf [https://perma.cc/7GFW-4U8F] (detailing ALEC’s influence in Florida, 
including passage of the Citizens’ Right to Know bill). 
 128 See id.; Reutter & Motel, supra note 2. Such reports would include: 
a list of each charge filed against each individual accepted into a pretrial release pro-
gram . . . a list of all prior criminal convictions of each individual accepted into a pretri-
al release program . . . a list of the court appearances required of each individual ac-
cepted into a pretrial release program . . . [and] a list of each instance during the report-
ing period on which an individual accepted into a pretrial release program . . . failed to 
appear at a scheduled court appearance. 
See H.R. 1885, 112th Cong. (2011) 
 129 See Liptak, supra note 44 (detailing the county-level involvement of the bail bond industry 
and its interaction with pretrial release programs); see also supra notes 1–12 and accompanying text 
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of the Citizen’s Right to Know Act was introduced in May 2011.130 The legis-
lation would require any state or local pretrial release programs that receive 
federal funding to issue monthly reports to the U.S. Department of Justice.131 
The bill has been referred to the House Subcommittee on Crime, Terrorism, 
and Homeland Security, but Congress has taken no further action.132 
B. How Bail Bondsmen Affect Bail Administration 
Subsection 1 reviews the bail practices of states that have eliminated the 
use of commercial bail bondsmen.133 Subsection 2 reviews the bail practices of 
states that still use commercial bail bondsmen as a method of pretrial re-
lease.134 Subsection 3 highlights the practice of PSAs in Washington, D.C., 
which has practically eliminated the use of commercial bail bondsmen.135 
1. Bail in States Without Bail Bondsmen 
Only four states—Wisconsin, Illinois, Oregon, and Kentucky—have elim-
inated the use of commercial bail to secure pretrial release for the accused.136 
In doing so, the states exclude private, for-profit businesses from this form of 
involvement in the justice system.137 
Wisconsin eliminated corporate sureties and sureties for profit for crimi-
nal bail bonds in 1979.138 In place of a general bail system centered on com-
mercial bail bonding, Wisconsin has a bail system based on release on recogni-
                                                                                                                           
(describing the successful efforts of the bail bond industry in Broward County to defund and eliminate 
pretrial services agencies). 
 130 See H.R. 1885; see also American Bail Coalition, SOURCEWATCH, http://www.sourcewatch.
org/index.php/American_Bail_Coalition#ALEC_and _ABC.27s_Legislative_Agenda [https://perma.
cc/734L-Y3DT] (describing the legislative efforts that the American Bail Coalition and ALEC sup-
port). 
 131 See H.R. 1885. 
 132 See id.; see also Reutter & Motel, supra note 2 (discussing ALEC’s support of the bail bond 
lobby). 
 133 See infra notes 136–154 and accompanying text. 
 134 See infra notes 155–167 and accompanying text. 
 135 See infra notes 168–177 and accompanying text. 
 136 See 725 Ill. Comp. Stat. Ann. 5/110-13 (West 1964); KY. REV. STAT. ANN. § 431.510 (Lexis 
Nexis 2010); OR. REV. STAT. § 135.245 (2015); WIS. STAT. § 969.12 (2013–14); see also Stephens v. 
Bonding Ass’n of Ky., 538 S.W.2d 580, 584 (Ky. Ct. App. 1976) (refraining from nullifying a law 
prohibiting commercial bail bonding in Kentucky); Kahn v. McCormack, 299 N.W.2d 279, 283 (Wis. 
Ct. App. 1980) (holding a statute effectively banning commercial bail in Wisconsin constitutional). 
 137 See KENNEDY & HENRY, supra note 117, at 9 (noting that the greatest cost of commercial bail 
practices is courts’ delegation of power to private interests). 
 138 See WIS. STAT. § 969.12; Bruce Murphy, Opinion, The Wisconsin Budget’s Private Bail Bond 
System Spells the Return of Debtor’s Prison, ISTHMUS (June 13, 2013), http://isthmus.com/
opinion/opinion/the-wisconsin-budgets-private-bail-bond-system-spells-the-return-of-debtors-prison/ 
[https://perma.cc/EU68-82NV] (noting that Wisconsin’s system was created by law in 1979). 
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zance, unsecured appearance bonds, and secured bonds paid to the court.139 
When deciding conditions of release, judges must set reasonable conditions 
designed to ensure appearance in court, and protect members of the communi-
ty from serious bodily harm and witnesses from intimidation.140 If cash bail is 
imposed, it must be only in an amount found necessary to ensure the appear-
ance of a defendant.141 
In Wisconsin, professional justice associations almost universally oppose 
the return of commercial bail bonding to the state.142 These typically adversari-
al organizations unite as unlikely allies in their rejection of the return of com-
mercial bail to Wisconsin.143 In their view, there is no demonstrable need for 
commercial bail and the return of the industry would come with great costs to 
Wisconsin—both financial and moral.144 Instead of commercial bail, focus has 
                                                                                                                           
 139 See WIS. STAT. § 969.02. 
 140 Id. at § 969.01; see Kate Lind, Should Wisconsin Allow Commercial Bail in Pretrial Release?, 
WIS. POL’Y RES. INST. REP. (2013), http://www.wpri.org/WPRI/Reports/2013/Should-Wisconsin-
Allow-Commerical-Bail-in-Pretrial-Release.htm# [https://perma.cc/5WBG-V8Q6] (explaining the 
conditions of pretrial release in Wisconsin). 
 141 See WIS. STAT. § 969.01. 
 142 See Murphy, supra note 138 (arguing that a 2013 budget bill that returned commercial bail 
bond to Wisconsin was driven by special interest groups and rejected by justice system associations). 
When legislators tried to pass a bill in 2011 that returned commercial bail bondsmen to Wisconsin, the 
bill was opposed by the Wisconsin District Attorneys Association, the Wisconsin Association of 
Criminal Defense Attorneys Association, all forty-seven Milwaukee County judges, all ten of the 
state’s chief circuit judges, and the Wisconsin Sheriffs and Deputy Sheriffs Association. See id. 
 143 See Governor Vetoes Provisions Permitting Commercial Bail in Wisconsin Budget Bill, SUR. & 
FID. ASS’N OF AM. (July 1, 2013), http://www.surety.org/news/130805/Governor-Vetoes-Provisions-
Permitting-Commercial-Bail-in-Wisconsin-Budget-Bill.htm [https://perma.cc/M43A-GQQX] (detail-
ing Governor Scott Walker’s veto of a 2013 Wisconsin budget bill that would have authorized the 
establishment of a pilot program for commercial bail bonds). When deciding whether to allow com-
mercial bail bondsmen in Wisconsin, Governor Scott Walker faced pressure from the law enforcement 
community to veto bail provisions in a budget bill. See id. The Governor used his veto power to re-
move the bail provisions from the bill. See id. 
 144 See Patrick Marley, Bail Bondsmen, Lake Michigan Among Special-Interest Items in Budget 
Plan, J. SENTINEL (Wis.) (June 5, 2013), http://www.jsonline.com/news/statepolitics/bail-bondsmen-
lake-michigan-among-special-interest-items-in-budget-plan-b9927006z1-210231371.html [https://
perma.cc/C9W8-3F45] (noting that Wisconsin’s judges, prosecutors, and law enforcement agencies 
are united against allowing commercial bail bondsmen back into Wisconsin). When asked about 
commercial bail bonding, Milwaukee Police Chief Edward Flynn stated, “It’s not something profes-
sional law enforcement recommends, it’s not something the judiciary recommends and it’s not (some-
thing) anybody who has a role in the criminal justice (system) recommends. I don’t understand the 
motivation.” Id.; see also Jason Stein & Patrick Marley, Republican Lawmakers May Try to Resurrect 
Bail Bonding, J. SENTINEL (Wis.) (May 18, 2013), http://www.jsonline.com/news/statepolitics/
republican-lawmakers-may-try-to-resurrect-bail-bonding-k19vhej-208017101.html [https://perma.
cc/3G68-KTLN] (describing bipartisan opposition to the prospect of commercial bail bondsmen oper-
ating in Wisconsin). 
2016] Eliminating the Use of Commercial Bail Bondsmen 1357 
largely shifted to developing pretrial services that carefully monitor release of 
the accused and that can largely guarantee reappearance in court.145 
Other bail systems, such as Kentucky’s, rely on pretrial programs.146 To 
replace the for-profit bail system in Kentucky, the state chose to use pretrial 
programs.147 Like most pretrial programs, courts in Kentucky determine 
whether defendants are entitled to pretrial release or bail by factors such as: 
flight risk, likelihood of the defendant to appear in court, and likelihood to be a 
danger to others.148 If pretrial release is granted, the defendant is released on 
his or her own recognizance, or ordered to participate in a GPS monitoring 
program.149 
Unlike most pretrial programs, Kentucky’s pretrial programs function un-
der the presumption that defendants are innocent until proven guilty and de-
serve a reasonable opportunity not to be kept in jail until tried.150 Additionally, 
the state grants assistance to those defendants who are not granted pretrial re-
lease.151 Those who have bail imposed upon them are permitted, absent certain 
factors, a credit of $100 per day as payment toward the amount set for each 
day, or a portion of the day, that the defendant is to spend in jail before trial 
commences.152 When there has been sufficient credit accrued to satisfy the 
                                                                                                                           
 145 See JUSTICE INITIATIVES INST., JUDGING BY THE EVIDENCE: FAIR AND EFFECTIVE PRETRIAL 
JUSTICE IN WISCONSIN (2013), http://www.jiinstitute.org/s/JII-Article-Bail-Bonding-Pretrial-06192013.
pdf [https://perma.cc/NFD7-FYAU]. 
 146 See KY. REV. STAT. ANN. § 431.510 (Lexis Nexis 2010) (prohibiting the use of commercial bail 
bondsmen to secure pretrial release); ABA CRIMINAL JUSTICE SECTION, STATE POLICY IMPLEMENTA-
TION PROJECT 2 (2011), http://www.americanbar.org/content/dam/aba/administrative/criminal_
justice/spip_handouts.authcheckdam.pdf [https://perma.cc/S74G-GATA] (describing the history of pre-
trial release in Kentucky and noting the state’s abolishment of commercial bail bondsmen and implemen-
tation of a PSA); Interview Process & Release Alternatives, KY. COURT OF JUSTICE, http://courts.
ky.gov/courtprograms/pretrialservices/Pages/interviewrelease.aspx [https://perma.cc/3RYD-VHXQ] 
(noting that Kentucky was the first state to abolish commercial bail bondsmen and create a pretrial re-
lease program). 
 147 See Interview Process & Release Alternatives, supra note 146. In place of a for-profit bail 
system, the Kentucky General Assembly created the Pretrial Services Agency in 1976 as a division of 
the Administrative Office of the Courts. See id. 
 148 See KY. REV. STAT. ANN. § 431.510. Pretrial officers interview every defendant within twelve 
hours of arrest. See Interview Process & Release Alternatives, supra note 146. These officers serve all 
120 Kentucky counties and are available for service 24 hours a day, 7 days a week. See id. In addition 
to a detailed personal interview, the officers conduct a criminal background check and a risk assess-
ment before making a recommendation to the court regarding conditions of release. See id. 
 149 See KY. REV. STAT. ANN. § 431.067 (Lexis Nexis Supp. 2015). 
 150 See Shima Baradaran, Restoring the Presumption of Innocence, 72 OHIO ST. L.J. 723, 734 
(2011) (exploring the presumption of innocence in pretrial restraints on liberty); see also The Legal 
Precedents Outlawing Bounty Hunter and Bail Bondsman Jobs in Kentucky, BOUNTYHUNTEREDU.
ORG, http://www.bountyhunteredu.org/kentucky/ [https://perma.cc/2PHW-HWBS] (describing statu-
tory provisions that outlawed the commercial bail industry). 
 151 See KY. REV. STAT. ANN. § 431.066. 
 152 See id. 
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bail, the defendant is released on his or her own recognizance.153 If the defend-
ants can pay ten percent of the bail amount, in cash or by property bond, the 
bail amount is returned to the defendant as long as they are not charged with 
failure to appear.154 
2. Bail Bondsmen on Every Corner 
Most states have not eliminated the practice of commercial bail bond-
ing.155 In many of these states, pretrial release services are used in conjunction 
with the bail bond industry, but the relationship between pretrial services and 
the bail bond industry is rarely harmonious.156 Because pretrial services can 
negatively affect their profit, the bail bond industry will often attempt to dis-
mantle pretrial release programs.157 
The bail bond industry is not always successful in pushing through legis-
lation.158 Many states oppose the additional regulation of pretrial release ser-
vices that have been established in their state.159 In Virginia, pretrial services 
agencies produce monthly reports and quarterly narratives on the outcomes of 
the defendants for whom they secure release.160 Despite these existing report-
                                                                                                                           
 153 See COMMONWEALTH OF KY. DEP’T. OF PUB. ADVOCACY, KENTUCKY PRETRIAL RELEASE 
MANUAL 20 (2013) (explaining the pretrial release and bail process for Kentucky). Certain defendants 
are excluded from the ability to receive the $100 per day credit. Id. The credit toward bail does not 
apply to any person convicted of or pleading guilty to, or entering an Alford plea (a plea of guilt with-
out making an admission of guilt) to certain felonies. Id. The credit will also not apply to someone 
who is a violent offender, or who is determined by a court to present a flight risk or to be a danger to 
others. See id.; see also KY. REV. STAT. ANN. § 439.3401 (Lexis Nexis 2010). 
 154 See KY. REV. STAT. ANN. § 431.066. If bail is set and the bond is to be partially secured by 
payment of ten percent, the defendant will receive the bail credit of $100 per day. See id. The credit 
will apply to the ten percent needed to secure release and not the entire amount of the bail. See id. 
 155 See Cliff Collins, The Question of Commercial Bail: Bail Industry Wants Oregon to Return to 
a System It Once Rejected, OR. ST. B. BULL., Oct. 2014, at 17 (noting that forty-six states still use a 
commercial bail system); see also DEVINE, supra note 107, at 4. 
 156 See Alysia Santo, When Freedom Isn’t Free, THE MARSHALL PROJECT (Feb. 23, 2015, 7:15 
AM), https://www.themarshallproject.org/2015/02/23/buying-time#.pREG4bAmf [http://perma.cc/
WER7-8ZST] (detailing bail industry arguments against the expansion of pretrial services and argu-
ments for the use of traditional bail bonds). See generally MELANIE LEDGERWOOD, ACCREDITED 
SUR. & CAS. CO., FACTS REGARDING THE COMMERCIAL BAIL INDUSTRY (2012) (responding to 
common criticisms of the bail bonding industry from the criminal justice community). 
 157 See LEDGERWOOD, supra note 156, at 7 (arguing that forcing a defendant into pretrial release 
agencies is equivalent to ignoring the fundamental principle of innocent until proven guilty); see also 
Nichols, supra note 4 (exploring the involvement of the bail bond industry in defunding Broward 
County PSAs). 
 158 See Laura Sullivan, Inmates Who Can’t Make Bail Face Stark Options, NPR (Jan. 22, 2010 
12:00 AM), http://www.npr.org/templates/story/story.php?storyId=122725819 [https://perma.cc/79QS-
4ZFK] (noting some unsuccessful outcomes of the bail bondsman industry’s attempts at regulation of 
pretrial release services). 
 159 See id. 
 160 See KENNETH ROSE, A “NEW NORM” FOR PRETRIAL JUSTICE IN THE COMMONWEALTH OF 
VIRGINIA: PRETRIAL RISK-BASED DECISION MAKING 4 (2013) (exploring the history of Virginia’s 
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ing requirements, in 2009 a Virginia lawmaker proposed a bill based on Flori-
da’s Citizens’ Right to Know Act.161 The bill was unsuccessful.162 The bill’s 
text was identical to ALEC’s proposed legislation for the Citizens’ Right to 
Know bill, and some of the requisite measures would not have been applicable 
in Virginia.163 In May 2009, a North Carolina legislator introduced the Citi-
zens’ Right to Know Act to the state.164 North Carolina’s legislators dropped 
this bill due to intervention from the legal community.165 
Though unsuccessful in passing the bill, the bail bond industry still oper-
ates in these states and continues to challenge the viability of pretrial services 
agencies.166 Pretrial services agencies must constantly fight to stay open and 
effectuate their goal of releasing qualified defendants through their pro-
grams.167 
3. Washington, D.C.’s Pretrial Services Agency: The Gold Standard 
Similar to the four states that have banned commercial bail bondsmen, 
Washington, D.C. (“the District”) has largely eliminated commercial bail 
bonding in favor of alternative release methods.168 The District accomplished 
this feat through a mix of practice and bail-related legislation that specifically 
                                                                                                                           
pretrial release services and the general pretrial practices of Virginia). See generally MARIE VAN-
NOSTRAND ET AL., IN PURSUIT OF LEGAL AND EVIDENCE-BASED PRETRIAL RELEASE RECOMMEN-
DATIONS AND SUPERVISION (2011) (detailing the reporting practices of Virginia’s pretrial release 
services). 
 161 See NAT’L ASS’N OF PRETRIAL SERVS. AGENCIES, THE TRUTH ABOUT COMMERCIAL BAIL 
BONDING IN AMERICA 5 (2009) (describing ALEC’s attempts to pass a Citizen’s Right to Know Act 
in Virginia) 
 162 See id. The bill’s failure was largely due to a fiscal impact statement prepared by the state’s 
Department of Planning and Budget. See id. The statement estimated that passage of the bill would 
require one full-time equivalent staff person for each of the thirty programs. See id. Additionally, the 
overall cost of the bill would have been $1.5 million annually. See id. 
 163 See Virginia, ALECEXPOSED, http://www.alecexposed.org/wiki/Virginia [https://perma.cc/
YP5G-4Z5N] (detailing ALEC’s legislative efforts in Virginia). 
 164 See Ned Barnett, A Primer on ALEC, Its Influence and Its Presence in North Carolina, INDY 
WEEK (Sept. 28, 2011), http://www.indyweek.com/indyweek/a-primer-on-alec-its-influence-and-its-
presence-in-north-carolina/Content?oid=2666829 [https://perma.cc/KQ9F-ZDY4]. 
 165 See id. 
 166 See Dietrich, supra note 119 (detailing the efforts of the bail bonding industry in Florida, 
North Carolina, Oregon, and Virginia to reduce pretrial services); Liptak, supra note 44 (exploring the 
practice of bail bond agents and the tension that exists between the agents and the pretrial services 
agencies). 
 167 See JUSTICE POLICY INST., supra note 78; Sullivan, supra note 3 (exploring tensions between 
pretrial services agencies and the bail bondsman lobby). 
 168 See D.C. CODE § 23-1321 (2012). The D.C. statute does not explicitly prohibit commercial 
bail, but the wide range of conditions of release only allow for detention in specific circumstances 
thus effectively eliminating commercial bail. See id. 
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spells out how money can be used in bail decisions.169 The District did not rely 
merely on legislation banning the practice of commercial bail bondsmen.170 
Instead of commercial bail bonds, the District relies on the D.C. Pretrial 
Services Agency (“D.C. PSA”) in its bail determinations.171 The D.C. PSA 
serves two primary roles for the District: (1) collecting information about pre-
trial defendants and reporting this information to the court with its release or 
detention decision; and (2) supervising pretrial defendants released by the 
court with conditions of supervision and informing the court of any violations 
of these release conditions.172 Through the use of a PSA, the District boasts 
significantly lower pretrial detainment rates than the national average.173 
The D.C. Pretrial Services Agency conducts a risk assessment for defend-
ants to assist judicial officers in determining whether pretrial release or deten-
tion is appropriate.174 The decisions by the D.C. Pretrial Services Agency are 
centered on the premise that a defendant’s inability to pay should not deter-
mine the length of pretrial detention.175 Therefore, 80% of people charged with 
an offense in D.C. are released on nonfinancial bail options and only 15% are 
kept in pretrial detention.176 D.C. PSA has reported an 88% success rate for 
completion of appearance in court without being rearrested, which is higher 
than the national average.177 
IV. ELIMINATION OF COMMERCIAL BAIL AND AN INCREASED  
RELIANCE ON PRETRIAL SERVICES AGENCIES 
Conditions of pretrial release should be set only to the extent that they se-
cure the reappearance of defendants in court.178 Any conditions that go beyond 
securing release unreasonably burdens not only our criminal justice system but 
also effectively punishes pretrial detainees who have a presumption of inno-
                                                                                                                           
 169 See id. 
 170 See id. 
 171 See Bruce Beaudin, The D.C. Pretrial Services Agency: Lessons from Five Decades of Innova-
tion and Growth, CASE STUDIES (n.d.) (exploring the function and history of the D.C. Pretrial Ser-
vices Agency). 
 172 See id. 
 173 See id. 
 174 See id. See generally KIDEUK KIM & MEGAN DENVER, A CASE STUDY ON THE PRACTICE OF 
PRETRIAL SERVICES AND RISK ASSESSMENT IN THREE CITIES (2011) (exploring the use of PSAs in 
Washington, D.C., New York City, and Baltimore). 
 175 See D.C. CODE § 23-1321. 
 176 Beaudin, supra note 171. 
 177 See id. 
 178 See CLARK, supra note 56, at 23 (describing the process a judge is expected to undertake when 
making bail decisions). 
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cence until proven guilty.179 Additionally, detaining pretrial defendants solely 
based on their inability to pay is likely unconstitutional.180 Pretrial services 
programs have demonstrated the ability to guarantee reasonable, risk-based 
assessments about the necessary conditions to secure reappearance.181 Despite 
this, the commercial bail bondsman industry continues a systematic attack on 
the efficiency and viability of these programs.182 
 The U.S. criminal justice system has been drawn into public focus in re-
cent years, and bail reform must become a part of this conversation.183 Bail 
determinations are integral to the administration of criminal justice and affect 
many facets of our system, such as jail overcrowding and the very outcome of 
criminal cases.184 Therefore, our system must ensure that private interests do 
not allow unjust outcomes in relation to our bail system.185 Recognizing this, 
four states have eliminated the use of commercial bail bondsmen in their juris-
dictions, and Washington, D.C. uses a system of pretrial release that practically 
eliminates commercial bail bondsmen.186 The rest of the country must also un-
dertake this process in order to properly reform our bail system.187 
This Part argues that states should eliminate commercial bail bondsmen 
and create systems centered on alternative release methods rather than mone-
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tary bail.188 Section A recommends that states pass legislation consistent with 
Wisconsin’s bail reform statute to eliminate the use of commercial bail bonds-
men.189 Section B recommends that states create pretrial services agencies in 
order to help judges make fair and just bail determinations.190 
A. Eliminating the Commercial Bail Bondsman Industry 
In order to recenter the bail system to focus on pretrial release via meth-
ods other than monetary bail, states should pass legislation that eliminates the 
use of commercial bail bondsmen.191 Most crimes are tried in state courts, and 
each state controls its own bail administration. 192 Therefore, passage of state 
legislation is the most efficient and logical first step in reforming bail poli-
cies.193 
Wisconsin’s statute regarding bail and other conditions of release should 
act as a model for state legislation that eliminates the commercial bail indus-
try.194 This statute explicitly eliminates the commercial bail bondsman industry 
while also explicitly mandating that bail may only be set to the extent that it 
assures a defendant’s reappearance in court.195 There is a presumption of re-
lease in most instances that will help decrease the number of pretrial detain-
ees.196 Though there is typically a presumption of release, the statute provides 
                                                                                                                           
 188 See infra notes 178–216 and accompanying text. 
 189 See infra notes 191–204 and accompanying text. 
 190 See infra notes 205–216 and accompanying text. 
 191 See KY. REV. STAT. ANN. § 431.510 (prohibiting commercial bail bondsmen from operating in 
Kentucky); OR. REV. STAT. § 135.245 (mandating that a magistrate must secure the reappearance of a 
defendant through the least onerous conditions, effectively eliminating commercial bail bondsmen 
through practice); WIS. STAT. § 969.12 (describing surety as a “resident of state” and barring compen-
sation for acting as a surety). 
 192 See DAVID W. NEUBAUER & HENRY F. FRADELLA, AMERICA’S COURTS AND THE CRIMINAL 
JUSTICE SYSTEM 105 (12th ed. 2016) (noting that state courts receive ninety-five times as many filed 
cases as federal courts). State courts have broad jurisdiction, and the only cases they are not allowed 
to hear are lawsuits against the United States and those involving certain specific federal laws. What 
the Federal Courts Do, FED. JUDICIAL CTR., http://www.fjc.gov/federal/courts.nsf/autoframe?open
agent&nav=menu2&page=/federal/courts.nsf/page/B91008A99B88857E85256A540009F8C1?open
document [https://perma.cc/2PKN-RD62]. 
 193 See KY. REV. STAT. ANN. § 431.510 (prohibiting commercial bail bondsmen from operating in 
Kentucky); OR. REV. STAT. § 135.245 (mandating practices that effectively eliminate commercial bail 
bondsmen through practice); WIS. STAT. § 969.12 (describing surety as a “resident of state” and bar-
ring compensation for acting as a surety). 
 194 See WIS. STAT. ANN. § 969.12; Michael Phillis, Wisconsin Judges Say Bail Bonds System 
Would Shortchange Crime Victims, J. SENTINEL (Wis.) (June 15, 2013), http://www.jsonline.com/
news/statepolitics/wisconsin-judges-say-bail-bonds-system-would-shortchange-crime-victims-b99
33511z1-211705671.html [https://perma.cc/K9KP-TGZG] (arguing that a return to allowing commer-
cial bail bondsmen in Wisconsin would result in a loss of millions of dollars for victims of crime); see 
also Murphy, supra note 118 (noting that the rate of defendants that fail to appear in Wisconsin is 
significantly below the national average despite the prohibition of commercial bail bonding). 
 195 See WIS. STAT. ANN. § 969.12. 
 196 See id. 
2016] Eliminating the Use of Commercial Bail Bondsmen 1363 
for conditional detainment in cases in which a defendant is seen as a risk to the 
community or is accused of committing a violent crime.197 Therefore, the Wis-
consin statute ensures that most defendants are not detained before they are 
convicted, while adequately protecting the public from those defendants who 
may pose a true safety threat.198 
Any attempts to pass such legislation are sure to face opposition from the 
bail bondsman lobby.199 This opposition will likely be stronger in states in 
which ALEC has successfully helped pass legislation.200 Similar to other polit-
ical battles, passage of this reform legislation will depend on messaging and 
community support.201 Initial targeting of states in which ALEC has failed to 
pass their model act will allow such a widespread reform to gain momen-
tum.202 Additionally, members from all facets of the criminal justice communi-
ty support the elimination of commercial bail bondsmen.203 This support from 
typically adversarial parties is essential to passage of this legislation.204 
B. Increase the Use of Pretrial Services Agencies 
In order to fill the void in the criminal justice system created by the elim-
ination of commercial bail bondsmen, states should also pass legislation that 
establishes pretrial services agencies.205 A high-functioning pretrial services 
agency will help courts make informed pretrial release and detention deci-
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sions.206 Additionally, for release methods other than monetary bail, the pretrial 
services agency will provide appropriate levels of supervision and treatment 
for released defendants.207 By establishing such agencies, states will allow 
courts to move away from a bail system driven by money and private inter-
ests.208 
The statute governing the pretrial services agency of Washington, D.C. 
can act as a model for states aiming to pass similar legislation.209 The mission 
of these newly established pretrial services agencies would be to strongly en-
courage the use of non-financial release, the use of financial release only when 
non-financial options are not sufficient to ensure appearance, and the abolition 
of commercial surety bail.210 As a result of performing these tasks, unnecessary 
pretrial detention would be minimized, jail crowding would be reduced, and 
the pretrial release process would be administered fairly.211 
In establishing a PSA modeled after Washington, D.C.’s statute, states 
should adopt a similar mission to assist courts in giving defendants fair and 
just release conditions.212 Defendants should be interviewed by a PSA officer 
within twenty-four hours of arrest, and—with a presumption of release—fewer 
cases would be brought to court and fewer defendants would be detained pre-
trial.213 Additionally, adoption of a statute like D.C.’s has the potential to sig-
nificantly lower pretrial detainment rates.214 
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Much like the proposal to adopt a statute like Wisconsin’s that would 
eliminate commercial bail bondsmen, a proposal to adopt D.C.’s approach of 
using pretrial services agencies would also likely face opposition.215 Targeting 
states where ALEC has previously failed to promote commercial bond legisla-
tion and where there is support from the criminal justice community would 
allow legislation to gain momentum to eventually spread these reforms across 
the United States.216 
CONCLUSION 
Inability to post bail should not solely determine a defendant’s pre-trial 
detainment. Although there are instances in which monetary bail should be 
enforced, monetary bail should not become the default. Bail should be set only 
to the extent that it assures the reappearance of a defendant in court. Bail has a 
marked effect on every level of the criminal justice process, and as such, bail 
reform must be enacted in order to address an integral component of a broken 
criminal justice system. This can best be accomplished through elimination of 
commercial bail bondsmen and establishment of pretrial services agencies that 
focus bail decisions around non-monetary release methods. Given the adverse 
effects of pretrial detention, a fair and just criminal justice system cannot be 
based on a defendant’s access to funds or be driven by private interests. Justice 
will not allow it. 
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